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ENTRY
This matter came on for hearing before the Oil and Gas Board
of Review on May 4.1978 at· 10:30 a.m., at Fountain Square, Building
C, Columbus, Ohio pursuant to a notice of appeal dated March 16,

~<:!97~)and filed herein on March 17, 1978 by the Appellants appealing
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;.Ie;..

/ j/ '
I

~

c;, 'f'..;;7

from Adjudication Order No. 229 issued by Andrew G. Ska1kos, as
Chief of the Division of Oil and Gas. on March 6, 1978.

Witnesses

testifying and exhibits filed in this appeal are listed in the
indices to the transcript of the hearing.
I.

The Background

Adjudication Order No. 229 is an order for the mandatory pooling,
pursuant to the provisions. of Section 1509.27, Ohio Revised Code,
of three tracts of land located in Portage County; Atwater Township,
~hio.

..

one of which tracts is held by the Appellants in fee simple

subject to an oil and gas lease held by Viking Resources Corporation

("Vikipg").

The order states that "mandatory pooling is hereby

established ... to permit the drilling of wells under Percits 1369
and 1370, Portage County, issued concurrently with this order ... ".
These

DvO

wells are to be located on a tract of land held

~y

Herbert and Ruth .P. Carsten in fee simple subject to an oil and
gas lease held by Orion Energy Corporation ("Orion").

This Ca=sten

tract lies to the North of the Appellant's tract and is one of the
three

trac~s

of land subject to the mandatory pooling order.

third tract that is subject to the pooling order is

locat~d

The
to the

South of the Appellant's tract and is held by Edward L. and Irene M.
Kruse in fee simple subject to an oil and gas lease held by Orion.
The adjudication order and permits 1369 and 1370 were issued
in response to applications for permits to drill and for mandatory
pooling submitted to the Division of Oil and Gas on August 31, 1977
by Orion pursuant to Section 1509.27 of the Ohio Revised Code.
These applications were made by Orion as the "owner", as that term
is defined in Section 1509.0l(K), Ohio Revised Code, of the Carsten
tract upon which the two wells are proposed to be drilled.
is also the owner of Kruse Tract.

Orion

The owner, in the statutory sense,

. of the Appellant's tract is Viking, but Viking' 5 lease does not
expressly authorize Viking to enter into a voluntary pooling agreement.

Viking did not object to the pooling of the three tracts but

it would not enter into a voluntary pooling agreement
consent of the Appellants.

the

wit~out

The fee owners of the Carsten and Kruse

tracts did not object to the pooling.

The Appellants, hONever,

did object to the pooling, whether voluntary

~r

mandatory, and they

requested a hearing on the applications pursuant to Section 1509.27
of the Ohio Revised Code.
Despite the objections of the Appellants, the drilling permits
were issued

a~d

the applications for mandatory pooling

~ere

granted,

the pooling being ordered by the subject Adjudication Order.

The

Appellants then filed .their notice of appeal in this proceeding.
II.

The Issues

In their request for a hearing on the applications £0- the
drilling permits and the pooling orders, the Appellants stated
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their objections in the following terms:
[T1hat they do not believe tha.t ~·tandatory
Pooling is necessary to protect correlative
rights or to provide effectiv~ development
use or conservation of oil and gas; furthermore, the lease of Pete and Wanda Karas, by
its terms, prohibits unitization of any of
their property without their express consent.
The subject Karas property is a porticn of
an approximate six-hundred acre block that
is being fully and adequately developed by
fifteen existing oil and gas ~oTells. Furthermore, it would be unjust and inequitable to
impose Handatory Pooling upon said tract.
In addition, the Mandatory Pooling Statute,
O.R,C. 1509.27, is violative of the Ohio
and U.S, Constitutions,
[Chief ',s Exhibits Hand 11
The notice of appeal herein expands .upon these objections in
the following terms:
Appellants, Pete and Wanda Karas, are
appealing and requesting a hearing on ORDER
NO. 229 on the grounds that they do not believe
Mandatory Pooling is necessary to protect
correlative rights or to provide effective
development use or conservation of oil and gas;
furthermore, the lease of Pete and t~anda Karas,
by its terms, prohibits unitization of any
other property without their expressed consent. The subject, Karas property described
above, (19.14 acres) is a portion of a 592.54
acre tract which is being fully and adequately
developed by 15 existing oil and gas wells.
In order to be in compliance with the Division
of Natural Resources Regulation ~ro-l-04 (C)
(4) (A) a variance was granted.
ORDER NO, 229 releases said 19.14 acre
tract previously committed to the well drilled
under Permit 1009 (on the 592.54 acre tract)
and committed to the Mandatory Pooling unit
created by ORDER NO. 229.
In addition, Viking Resources Corporation
o'f Cincinnati, Ohio, who holds the mineral
leasehold to the Karas property, is without
authority to participate in the }landatory
Pooling arrangement with Orien Energy Corporation under the terms of the trust agreement
wherein the property is held in trust for
Katherine F. and \.Janda M. ' Karas "
It would be unjust and inequitable to
impose Mandatory Pooling upon said tract and
the order of the Chief of the Division of
Oil and Gas is unlawful and unreasonable
under the circumstances.
Finally, the Mandatory Pooling Statutes,
O.R,C. 1509.27, et. seq., is violative of the
Ohio U,S. Constitutions, inter alia, a taking
of property i.s had wi thoutaue process and an
impairment of the obligation of contract is
created by the State of Ohio through the Ohio
Department of Natural Resources.
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Th~ ~uestions

presented for

d~termination

on this appeal are:

L,

Is the order appealed fr::;::n la.viul and reasonable?

2.

Is the Carsten tract of insufficient size or shaDe to

therequi~ements

3,

.

~~~.~

me~t

for drilling a well thereon?

Has the owner of the Carsten tract been unable to form a

drilling unit under agreement for voluntary pooling?
4.

Is the mandatory pooling order herein (i) necessary to

protect correlative rights or (ii) to provide effective development,
use, or conservation of oil and gas?
It should be noted that the Board is wit..'1out authority to
determine the constitutional question raised by the Appellants.

"ThE

issue of constitutionality can never be administratively determined,'
Mobil Oil Corp, v. Rocky River, 38 Ohio St. 2d 23. 26 (1974)
(Emphasis by the Court].

At the same time, the question of whether

the order is lawful and reasonable must, of necessity, involve some
of the same issues as do the constitutional questions.
III.

Findings of Fact

The Board finds that:
1 •. The tract upon which the two proposed wells are to be
drilled (the Carsten,tract) is roughly rectangular and consists of
76 acres.

The.westerly line of this tract is 809 feet long. the

easterly line 852 feet long.
2..

In view of the fact that the spacing requirements (Division

of Oil and Gas Rule

l50l;9-1~04)

for a well below 4,000 feet require

i) that the well be on a tract or drilling unit of at least 40
acres and ii) that the well be located at least 500 feet fr.om the
boundaries of the tract or drilling unit and at least 1000 feet
from any other well, unless a larger drilling unit is formed no
permit can lawful be issued for a well on the Carsten tract since
the well could not be located at a distance of more than 426 feet
from the northerly boundary or from the southerly boundary,
3.

Orion is the holder of an oil and gas lease to the Carsten

tract and is the person who has the right to drill on that tract
and to drill into and produce from a pool and to appropriate the
oil or gas that he produces therefrom either for himself or others
and is thus the owner of the Carsten tract, as "owner" is defined

~
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in Ohio Revised Code
4.,

§

l509.01(K).

Orion is also the holder of an oil and gas lease to the Kruse

tract within the proposed drilling unit, which tract is located to the
south of the Carsten tract and the
to the Appellants' tract.
5.

Appellants~

Orion is thus the

tract and is adjacent

owne~

The Kruse tract consists of 10,80 acres.

of the Kruse tract.
It is approximately.

rectangular and the easterly and westerly lines of the tract are
approximately' 173 feet long~
6.

In ,view of the spacing requirements, no permit can lawfully

be issued for a well on the Kruse tract.
7.

If the Kruse and Carsten tracts were adjacent and

~ere

pooled

to form one- tract, the spacing requirements would permit two wells
be drilled on the pooled tract.
S.

The Appellants' tract within the proposed drilling unit

lies between, and is adjoined by, the Carsten tract to the North and
the Kruse tract to the South.
9.

The Appellants' tract consists of 19.14 acres, is approximatel~

rectangular, and extends 308 feet from north to south.
10.

In view of the spacing requirements, no permit can lawfully

be issued for a well on the Appellants' tract.
11.

The Appellants' tract within the proposed drilling unit is

a part of a larger parcel of 592.54 acres belonging to the Appellants.
This parcel, including the 19.14 acre tract within the proposed
drilling unit, is subject to an oil and gas lease dated April 24, 1975,
between Atlas Energy Group. Inc .• as Lessee, and the Appellants as
Lessor.

The Lessee's interest in this lease was thereafter at signed

to Viking Resources Corporation on April 4, 1917.

Viking is thus the

person who has the right to drill on the entire parcel of 592.54
acres (including the 19.14 acre tract within the proposed drilling
unit) and to drill into and produce from a pool and to appropriate
the oil or gas that he produces therefrom either for himself or others.
12.

The lease that is held by Viking with respect to the

Appellants' tract contains no provision relating to the pooling
or unitization of that tract with other tracts so as to form a
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drilling unit.

Such ?001ing is neither forbidden nor permitted by

the express terms of the lease.

Ohio

R~vised

Code

§

1509.26, which

was in effect at the time of the execution of the lease, does however give Viking the power to agree to pool the Appellants' tract
with adjoining tracts to form a drilling unit.

But see Meyers and

Williams, Petroleum Conservation in Ohio, 26 Ohio St. L.J. 591, 602
(1965).
13.

Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code

§

1509.26 Orion attempted to

secure a vqluntary pooling of the three tracts thac are the subject
of the adjudication order so as to form a drilling unit permitting
two wells to be drilled within the unit •. Orion was unable to form
such a drilling unit under agreement because Viking would not agree
to the pooling of the Appellants' tract within the unit.

Viking has

no objections to the pooling and would, in. fact, be benefitted by the
F

.tg, but it was not willing to enter into the agreement without

the express permission of the Appellants.

The Appellants objected,

and still object, to any pooling of their tract.
14.

Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code

§

1509.26 Orion investigated

the possibility of pooling the Carsten tract with lapd located to the
North of that tract.

Orion concluded that it would be impractical to

form a voluntary drilling unit with the land to the North because
the title to that land is subject to a receivership and is divided
into many diverse interests.
15.

A drilling unit composed of the Carsten tract and land to

the North of the Carsten tract would be uneconomic and would not be
conducive to the effective development, use, or conservation of oil
and gas because a well located on such a drilling unit would have
to be inefficiently close to an existing well to the north that
would drain the same area.
16.

A drilling unit composed of the Carsten tract and)land to

the north of the Carsten tract would not be just and equitable as
it would fail to protect the correlative rights appurtenant to the
Kruse tract, which tract could not be included within such a drilling
unit.
17.

Thus Orion was unable to form a drilling unit under agreement

provided in section 1509.26 of the Revised Code. on a just and
equitable basis.
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18.

T:lere are no oil or gas "..:e 11.5 on a';'l.Y of the tracts that

are the subject of rhe mandatory
19.

pool~ng

order under appeal.

There are. however. 15 wells on that portion of the

Appellants' 592.54 acre parcel that is not within the proposed
drilling unit.

None of these wells arc

~-li::hin

500 feet or the

boundary of the proposed drilling unit. nor are any of these wells
within IQOO feet of either of the two proposed wells.

Since the

15 wells are located on oniy 592.54 acres, there was, before the
subject order was entered. only 39,5 acres per well.

The 15 wells

were drilled pursuant to a variance granted by the Division of Oil
and Gas from the acreage requirements of 1501:9-1-04(C)(4)(A).
When the 19.14 acres of the Appellants' tract included _dthin the
new drilling unit are subtracted from the parcel of 592.54 acres,
the 15 wells are located on a parcel of only 573.40 acres so that
there is only 38,23 acres per well.

The adjudication order that

is-subject to this appeal contains an additional variance that
permits this reduction in acreage per well.

Even when the parcel

on which the wells are located is reduced to 573.uO acres. the
variance amounts to a waiver of less than five percent of the 40
acre requirement.

Furthermore the proposed drilling unit contains

105.94 acres on which only

two wells will be located. Even if

the Appellants 19.14 acres is not counted as part of the new
drilling .unit. it would have 43\4 acres attributable to

it.

With

the Appellants' tract included, each well on the new drilling unit
will be on a 52:97 acre tract.

The Appellants' tract does not have

to be included within the drilling unit to satisfy
requirements.

th~ a~reage

More importantly, when the two new wells are

drill~d

there will be a totai of 17 wells on 679.34 acres so that the
average acreage attributable to each well will be 39.96 acres.

rnus

the total effect of the order under appeal is to reduce the amount
of variation from the acreage requirements.
20.

Two of the wells on the Appellants' 592.54 acre

parcel(~~ell!

H2 and #3 as shmm on Appellants Exhibit 23} could drain production

from the Carsten tract and one of these wells ({.V3) could also drain tr
Kruse ',tract.

There also r.:ay be some drainage from the Carsten tract

t

wells located on land to the north of the Carsten tract.
21.

The Adjudication Order that is the subject of this ap?eal

does not permit the operator of the drilling unit to go upon the
I

land that constitutes the A?pellants' tract.

In fact the order con-

tains the following restriction:
Orion Energy Corporation, its employees or
agents shall not trespass upon the surface
of the lands of Pete and Wanda Karas, as
unitized in this order, nor shall any attempt
be made to utilize said land surface in the
exploration, development or production of the
wells permitted by this order.
Nothing'in the Adjudication Order authorizes the operator

~f

the

drilling unit to commit any act that would constitute an actionable
nuisance with respect to the Appellants' land.
22.

The lease of the Appellants' 592.54 acres provides that

the'Appellants' are entitled to a one-eighth royalty of the productiox:
of oil and gas from the Appellants' land.

The order that is the

subject of this appeal provides that "the pro-rata portion of the
production to the owner of each tract [is to be] allocated on a
surface acreage basis."

Thus, since 11.93 acres of the Appellants'

tract is allocated to the well authorized by Permit No, 1370, the
Appellants will be entitled to a one-eight royalty in respect of
11.93/52.97 (or 22.5 percent) of the production from that well.
Since 7.21 acres of the Appellants' tract is allocated 'to the well
authorized by Permit No. 1369, the Appellants will be entitled to
a one-eighth royalty in

re~pect

the production from that well.

of 7.21/52.97 (13.6 percent) of
Although there may be some reduction

in the ultimate production from the wells now located on the
Appellants' 592.54 acre parcel to the extent that those wells drain
deposits that are located under the new drilling unit, this lost
production will be more than offset by the production of the two
new wells.

Thus the total royalty payments that the Appellants

will receive under their lease should be increased by the issuance
of the subject Adjudication Order and the drilling of the two neW"
wells contemplated by that order.
... 8

Furthermore the Appellants' are
r-

not entitled to receive royalties on production that is properly
attributable to the Carsten and Kruse tracts.
23.

The Appellants claim to be, and sincerely believe that

they are, aggrieved or adversely affected by the Adjudication Order
that is the subject of this Appeal.

Thus the Appellants are

entitled to bring this appeal pursuant to the provisions of section
1509.36, Ohio Revised Code.

The fact remains however that no

legally protected interest of the Appellants is invaded or adversely
affected by the subject order.
24.

The Appellants' objection to the order is not that it

deprives them of the opportunity to have additional wells on or
production from their land.

Thus the Appellant Pete Karas testified

with respect to wells on the Carsten land that he did not want any
wells near his property line but that otherwise:
what they do.

"1 don't care

If they pull the oil from underneath the 19 acres

[the Appellants' tract]. then, more power to them."
~4)

[Transcript 39,

In fact, the Appellants wish that they had never allowed any

wells to be drilled on their land.

Thus the Appellant Wanda Karas

testified that, if they had the opportunity to do it over again,
n[tlhere wouldn't be any lease at all,"
25.

[TranscriPt 70}.

The primary basis for the Appellants' objection to the

subject order appears to be their unhappiness with the operation
of the wells on their own land.

This unhappiness is, of course,

not.relevant to the question of whether wells should be drilled
on the

Ca~sten

tract.

The Appellants offered Appellants Exhibits 4

through 22 for identification to show the bases for their

unhappines~

with the operations of their lessee, but those exhibits were not
admitted into evidence as they were not relevant to any question
to be determined by the Board.
26.

The Appellants' objected that the two proposed wells are

too near to their property 1ine.

They are afraid thac their own

land will be damaged by the drilling of the new wells [Transcript
38-39]

It cannot be presumed. however. that any such damage will

occur.

An oil or gas well is not a nuisance per
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27.

The Appellants' also objected to the order L:landating the

pooling of their tract with the Carsten and Kruse tracts on the basi.s
that it would ir"Nol ve the Appellants in a "partnership" against their
wishes.

[Transcript 36, 47-48, 56, 60, 681]

This objection, which

is obviously sincerely made. appears to be based on ideological
rather than economic grounds.

The rationale behind this objection

was stated by the Appellant Wanda Karas:
Well, unitization, in my point of view,
is partnership, and I'll tell you. I went
through two different phases of life. I started
out as a secretary, and when I was a secretary,
all I was interested in was my l~~ch. my
appearance, and doing my job, I had no worries
about weather or any other conditions. I mean
io1h~n you go t:hrough the phase I went through.
you can realize this better, because when you
go in the building. you have no rain coming in
on you, or snow blowing, blizzards, and you
don't have anything, any animals to worry about
that you have to haul water in if your lights
go out, you have to milk by hand, you have to
worry to get in there on time, and have an air
conditioned office in the summertime. In the
wintertime, you have heat. We are out there
in our part now where we don't have those
things, I mean, and that's the reason, and when
you have unitization, you have partnerships,
and you don't know who you are going to unitize
with, if they know how hard it is to work on that
ground, what all the weather and everything, or
if it's easy for them, you don't know how they
got it.
[Transcript

47~48)

Well, my estimation of unitization is a
partnership. I would have to be a partnership,
because you are not the only one involved. you
and your neighbors, whoever is in the unitization,
is in together. He may be satisfied. just like
the meaning I give you of the office worker
going in, not caring about the weather, or the
man that has to do it the hard way, he may be
satisfied if they just tear the whole thing
up, and not give him a penny, whre in the mean~
time, I have a different viet.;point. I appreciate
the ground. The ground is more attractive to
me than the oil well any day. and I have a
different feeling towards things that my
unitized partner might not have.
[Transcript 60]
The objections of the plaintiffs are perhaps best summarized by the
following passage from the testimony of the Appellant Wanda Karas:
"The only objection we have is we want to preserve our rights for not
uniti"ing. and we don't want any damages on our ground."
68]
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[Transcript

28

The objection that the order at issue forces the Appellants

into an undesired partnership is based on a misconception of the facts.
The Appellants are not compelled to do anything' by the order.

Title

to the Appellants l land remains in the Appellants subject to the oil
and gas lease held by Viking, which lease was made by the Appellants
of their own volition.

The order does not permit anyone to go upon

the Appellants' land or to damage that land,

If a trespass

or a nuisanl

is committed the Appellants may seek their redress in the courts just
as they could if the order were not issued.
'.

,

The order does not force

the Appellants into any partnership or joint venture.

On

the facts

of this particular case the words "pooling" and "unitization" are
mislea~ing

and inappropriate.

All that the subject order does is to

permit the owner of the Carsten tract to drill two wells on the Carsten
tract, subject to the condition that royalties must be paid to the
Appellants and to the others who have interests in the land in the
drilling unit.

The order does not compel the Appellants to accept

these royalties.
29.

The subject order is necessary to protect the correlative

rights of those who have beneficial interests in the Carsten and
Kruse tracts.

The subject order is necessary to provide effective

development and conservation of oil and gas.

The pooling of the

three tracts and the drilling of the two wells is the only feasible
way of assuring those who have the beneficial interests in the Carsten
and Kruse tracts of the

reasonabl~

opportunity to recover and receive

the oil and gas in and under his tract or tracts. or the equivalent
thereof, without having to drill unnecessary wells or inc~r other
unnecessary expense.

The pooling and the drilling of the

t;·10 ..ells

allows the recovery of oil and gas that would not other-vise be recovered.
IV.

The Applicable Law

Section 1509.27 of the Ohio Revised Code provides in part:
I i a tract of land is of insufficient size
or shape to meet the requirements for drilling
a well thereon ... and the owner has been unable
to form a drilling unit under agreement .... the
owner of such tract may make application to the
division of oil and gas for a mandatory pooling
order.
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· •..• [T]he chief, if satisfied .•. that
mandatory pooling is necessary to protect
correlative rights or to provide effective
development. use, or conservation of oil and
gas, shall issue a drilling permit and a
mandatory pooling order ...•
This section is one of the key provisions of Chapter 1509 of the
Ohio Revised Code. which chapter is designed to protect both the
public interest in the conservation and efficient development of the
oil and gas within the state and the private property interests of
those. like the Appellants. who own land that overlies deposits of oil
and gas,
The purposes and workings of Chapter 1509 can best be understood
by comparing its provisions with the rules of law that were applicable
to oil and gas within the State of Ohio before the legislature
undertook to regulate the production of those minerals.

The leading

case on this subject. Kelley v, Ohio Oil Co'., 57 Ohio St. 317(1897),
in

~ny

ways resembles the instant case.

The plaintiff in Kelley

(who corresponds to the Appellants herein) sought to enjoin the
defendant. (who corresponds to Orion) from drilling wells on lands of
the .defendant which wells were located twenty-five feet from the
plaintiff?s land and extracted oil which originated under the
plaintiff's land.

The Court held:

To drill an oil well near the line of
one·s land. can not .interfere with the legal
rights of the owner of the adjoining lands.
so long as all operations are confined to the
lands upon which the well is drilled. Whatever gets into the well, belongs to the
owner of the well, no matter where it came
from. In such cases the well and its contents belong to the owner or lesse~ of the.
land, and no one can tell to a certainty
from whence the oil, gas or water which
enters the well came, and no legal rights
as to the same can be established or enforced by an adjoining land owner.
Id. at 327-28.
Protection of lines of adjoining lands.
by the drilling of wells on both sides of

such lines. affords an ample and sufficient
remedy for the supposed grievances com~
plained of in the petition and supplemental
petition, without resort to either an injunction or an accounting.

Id. ·at 329.

t".
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Thus under Ohio law, 'Vlere it not modified !Jy statute, Orion would
be emp.owered to drill wells on the Carsten tract (and on the Kruse
tract for that matter) immediately adjacent to the Appellants' land,
even though such wells would capture the oil and gas under
land.

Appe~lants'

The only protection that the Appellants (or Viking) would

have would be to drill wells on their own land immediately adjacent
to their boundary with the Carsten tract (and the Kruse tract).
It is clear on the facts of the present case that the Appellants
would not be content with such protection.
'.

They are not concerned

with capturing all the oil and gas located under their land; rather
they want to prevent any further wells from being located on their
land or anywhere near their land.

Kelley establishes, however, that

the Appellants have no right to prevent wells from being drilled
on the Carsten tract (or the Kruse tract) even if those wells are
located immediately next to the Appellants' land.
The Appellants concern about possible damage to their land is
Understandable. but that concern is protected by the law of trespass
and of nuisance.

The granting of permission by the Division of Oil

and'Gas ·to drill the two wells does not deprive the Appellants of
their right to relief in the courts if the drilling or the operation
of the wells should result in a trespass
respect to, their land.

upon, or a nuisance with

The subject order expressly forbids any

trespass upon the Appellants' land.
[W]hile what is authorized by law cannot
be a public nuisance, it may nevertheless
be a private nuisance, and the legislative
authority does not affect any claim of a
private citizen for damages for any special
inconvenience and discomfort caused by the
authorized act not experienced by the public
at large, or for an injunction. This rule
has been followed in Ohio, and the legislat~re
cannot authorize the creation of a continuing
nuisance which, in effect, becomes a standing'
menace to health and destroys private property.
If an enterprise authorized by law is operated
in such a manner as to constitute a private
nuisance, the person injured may recover
damages therefore, and equity. where the
circwustances are such as to give it jurisdiction, will enjoin the further continuance
of the nuisance.
41 Q. Jur. 2d III (1960).
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To the

ex~~nt

that the Appellancs are concerned about

~he

possib.ility of damage to their land. it should be noted that section
1509.072 of the Ohio Revised Code su?plies additional protection
that was not available at
part:

co~on

law.

~iat

section provides in

"No oil or gas well o..-uer or his agent shall fail to restore

the land surface within the area disturbed in siting. drilling.
completing. and produc.ing the well ••. ".
The rules established in Kelley still determine the basic rights
of

landown~rs

with respect to oil and gas under their land.

Each

has the right to drill for, and to produce. such oil and gas as
he

can capture from under

h:j.s

land.

:TIle owners of the Cars ten

and Kruse. tracts each have this r.ight and !).othing in chapter 1509
of the Ohio Revised Code deprives those owners of this right.
Kelley also established that each owner has the right to protect
his interests in preventing the oil and gas located under his land
from being captured by neighboring landowners.

The "remedy"

suggested by Kelley, each owner being allowed to drill a series of
wells right along the property line, is not the most satisfactory
means of protecting the property rights of owners of adjoining
tracts located over a single pool of oil or gas.
In the first place. the cost of drilling "defensive" wells that
are not necessary for the production of oil and gas is a waste of
the ow-uers' resources.

~fuere an~il

or gas field is divided among

many owners. it may not be profitable to drill any wells because
each owner must drill at least one well if he is to capture any
of "his" oil and gas and none of the many wells will produce enough
to pay the cost of drilling it, even though a lesser
would be profitable.

n~~ber

of wells

Furthermore. the only wayan owner can protect

his interests under the rule in Kelley's Case is to· produce his
wells as rapidly as possible, since any oil or gas that he does
not capture may be captured by his neighbor.

This has the unfortunate

consequence for the owner that he cannot choose the most profitable
rate of production.
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There appe~rs ',. to be some truth in the '"
dictcm that everybody's property is nobody·s
property. Wealth that is free for all is
valued by none because he who is foolhardy
enough to wait for its proper time of use
will only find that it has been taken by
another .... [T]he oil left under the earth
is valueless to the driller, for another
may legally take it. '"
A factor of production that is valued at nothing in the
business calculations of its users will
yield nothing in income ..••
Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Prooertv Resource: The Fishery:
62 J. Pol. Econ. 124, 135 (1954); See also Friedman, rne Economics of
the Common 'Pool: Property: Rights in Exhaustible Resources, 18 U.C.L.A.
L.Rev. 855 (1971).
The most important cost that results from the ftremedy" approved
by Kellev is that the necessity of rapid production could reduce the
total amount of oil and gas that can be produced from a field.

It

takes energy to ~roduce oil and gas and the natural sources of energy
in an oil field can be inefficiently dissipated and wasted if the oil
and gas are produced too rapidly.

If a field is produced too

rapidly, oil and gas which could have been recovered if the rate
of producticin had been slower may be lost forever.
In such circumstances, legislation supplying a better remedy
than the right to drill "defensive" wells is in the interest of
every owner of land in an oil or gas field.
Moreover,
Not only are the correlative rights of the
individual owners of the common propercy
involved, but the public at large has a
vital interest in the fullest development
and maximum recovery at the minimum cost
to the public of this valuable and most
important natural resource. These facts
have long been recognized by the courts
and are documented in many decisions.
Williams, Compulsory: Pooling and Unitization (of Oil and Gas Rights).
15th Anuual Institute on Oil and Cas Law and Taxation, 223, 226-27
(1964).
When property, in which several persons
have a common interest, cannot be fully and
beneficially enjoyed in its existing condition, the law often provides a way in which
they may compel one another to submit to
measures necessary to secure its beneficial
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enjovment, making eau:':;able cOl:lPensat1.on to
any ~hose control of or"interest in the
property is thereby ~odified.
Head v, A;noskeag ?-lfg. Co., 113 U. S, 9. 21(1885)"
Considerin~

these facts, it is not surprising that reany states

have passed legislation designed to prevent inefficiency and waste
in the production of oil and gas and to preserve the correlative
rights of owners to produce the oil and gas that is located under
their land,
As the\Supreme Court explained in Ohio Oil Co, v. Indiana, 177

U.S. 190 (1900), a case sustaining a state's power to regulate oil
and gas:
[AJs to gas and oil the surface proprietors
within the gas field all have the right to
reduce to possession the oil and gas beneath.
They could not be absolutely deprived of this
right which belongs to them without a taking
of private property. But there is a coequal
right in them all to take from a" common
source of supply the two substances .... It
follows from the essence of their right and
from the situation of the things as to which
it can be exerted, that the use by one of
his power to seek to convert a part of the
common fund to actual possession may result
in an undue proportion being attributed to
" one of the possessors of the right to the
detriment of the others, or by waste by one
or more to the annihilation of the rights
of the remainder. Hence it is that the
legislative power, from the peculiar nature
of the right and the objects upon which it
is to be exerted, can be manifested for the
purpose of protecting all the collective
owners, by securing a just distribution, "to
arise from the enjoyment, by them. of their
privilege to reduce to possession, and to
reach the like end by preventing waste ..•.
Viewed, then, as a statute to protect or to
prevent the waste of the common property of
the surfaCY owners, the law .. ,'",hich is here
attacked .•. is a statute protecting private
property and preventing it from being taken
by one of the common otmers without regard
to the enjoyment of the others.

Id. at 209-210.
Ohio Revised Code Chapter 1509 was adopted in 1965.

The purpose

of this statute is to prevent physical and economic waste and to
protect the correlative rights of mineral owners.

See Emens and

Lowe, Ohio Oil and Gas Conservation Law--The First Ten Years (19651975), 37 Ohio St. L.J. 31 (1976); Heyers and Williams. Petroleum
Conservation in Ohio, 26 Ohio St. L.J. 591 (1965).
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"loiaste". is defined asc
"Haste" includes:
(1) Physical waste, as such term is
generally understood in the oil and gas
industry;
(2) Inefficient, excessive, or improper use, or the unnecessary dissi?ation
of, reservoir energy;
(3) Inefficient storing of oil or gasi
(4) Locating, drilling, equipping,
operating. or producing an oil or gas well
in a manner that reduces or tends to reduce
the quantity of oil or gas ultimately
recoverable under prudent and proper
operations from the pool into which it is
drilled. or that causes or tends to cause
unnecessary or excessive surface loss or
destruction of oil or gas;
(5) Other underground or surface \-1aste
in the production or· storage of oil, gas,
or condensate, however caused.
Ohio Revised Code §l509.l (H)
lTjhe pr1mary thrust of the new statutory
provisions was toward the prevention of
physical and economic waste .. The act
authorized the Chief, with the consent
of the Technical Advisory Council. to set
minimum spacing requirements for drilling
in order to control the number of wells
which might be drilled on adjoining tracts
to drain the oil and gas from under a
given area, Mandatory pooling was authorized
to prevent waste as well as to protect
correlative rights. Unitization was
authorized if the Chief found "that such
operation is reasonably necessary to
increase substantially the ultimate ~ecovery
of oil and gas ... " subject to approval of
a required percentage of mineral and royalcy
owners. The act specifically required the
use of "every reasonable precaution in
accordance with the most approved methods
of operation to stop and prevent waste of
oil or gas, or both."
Emens and Lowe, supra, at 37.

[Footnotes omitted}

The law also provided a number of devices
to protect the correlative rights of minerel
owners. Voluntary pooling was specifically
permitted. The statute also provided that the
Chief might, upon application by the ow~er,
order the mandatory pooling of adjoining tracts
in order to protect the interests of one or more
of the owners, if voluntary arrangerr.ents could
not be negotiated. Special provision was made
to permit owners who were unable to join existing
adjacent drilling units and whose tracts were
too small to meet the standards set for t:linimuI1l
spacing requirements to drill on those tracts,
with limitation of production based on acreage
and well potential,
Id., at 36. [Footnotes ommited1
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'~orrelacive

rights U are defined as:

(I) "Correlative rights" means the
reasonable opportunity to every person entitled
thereto to recover and recei'Je the oil and gas
in and under his tract or tracts. or the equivalent thereof. without having to drill unnecessary
wells or incur other unnecess'ary expense.
Ohio Revised Code section 1509.01(1),
Thus the purpose of chapter 1509 is to su?ply more satisfactory,
remedies for landowners. whose oil and gas may 'be captured by others,
than the wasteful and inefficient right to drill defensive wells,
It protects both the interests of mineral owners and of the general
public by preventing waste.

But the chapter also has the purpose

of protecting the basic right of each landowner, as established in
Kellay, to be able to obtain the benefit of the petroleum under his
land.

In

view of this Board·s findings herein, it is apparent that

the Adjudication Order that is the subject of this appeal is authorized
by section 1509.27 of the Ohio Revised Code, since it is necessary
both to protect the correlative rights of those having a beneficial
interest in the Carsten and Kruse tracts and to provide effective
development and conservation of the oil and gas located under the
drilling tract provided by that order.
and protects correlative rights.
the owners of the

Carste~

The order prevents waste

If the order had nGt been issued,

and Kruse tracts would have been deprived

of the property rights that they have under the decision in Kelley
and that are protected by Chapter 1509.

On the other hand, since the Appellants have no right to prevent
the owners of the Carsten tract from drilling wells upon that tract,
the Appellants have not in any way been damaged by the issuance of
the subject order.

In fact the Appellants will be benefitted by

the receipt of addition.al royalties which they would not' have
received if the application for the' order had been denied.

The

Appellants' objection to the "mandatory" or "compulsory" pooling
is not well taken.
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Neither "pooling'! nor "unitization, II as
herein used, contemplates or requires a crossassignment of title to land or to oil and gas
rights. Prevalent pooling and unitization
statutes merely contemplate the joint development and operation of the lands as if included
in a single lease, a sharing of costs, and a
fair division of the production thus jointly
obtained.
The term "compulsory" is unfortunate but
is used because of common usage. It does not
mean arbitrary governmental action compelling
persons generally to act against their will any
more than does any other law passed to accommodate and adjust for the common and public
good, the co-related or correlative rights
and interests of all persons in a community,
or particularly those having interests in a
common property or common fund in instances
where they cannot agree. This is the purpose
and function of all laws. All are "compulsory"
in this sense, "Statutory pooling and unitization"
would be a better phrase.
Williams, supra, at 224-25.
The fact that the mineral lease to the Appellants' land does not
contain a clause permitting pooling is not a valid objection to the
~ubject

order, which could have been issued even if the Appellants

hadnever leased their land.

Although the Appellants do not want the

two new wells to be drilled on neighboring land, they have no right
to prevent it.

That is the teaching of Kelley.

The only change

that has occurred with the adoption of Chapter 1509 is that the
Appellants will receive the benefit of royalties from the production
of wells that are not located on their land.
V.

Conclusion

Based upon the findings of fact herein and the applicable law,
the Board finds that Adjudication Order No. 229 was lawful and
reasonable; and
ORDERS that Adjudication Order No. 229 be, and it hereby is, AFFIRMED.
This order effective this /0
day of ~' 1978.
OJJ:.~rD
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